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A FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE COURT*
Louis G. CALDWELLt

During the past year the decisions of the United States Supreme Court
in the "hot oil" ' and the "sick chicken" 2 cases have been cited so frequently
and for so many different propositions, that both the possibilities of the cases
and the patience of the listening public might justly be regarded as exhausted.
The proposal of the Special Committee on Administrative Law of the American Bar Association for the establishment of a federal administrative court
affords, however, an opportunity for reference to them from a point of view
which has received very little attention.
The cases are important to the proposal, not in furnishing any direct
authority one way or the other, but in suggesting an interesting contrast. In
one field of administrative law, having to do with delegations of legislative
power to executive or administrative agencies, the Supreme Court has, with
these decisions, at last made progress toward some sort of a boundary line
between two of the three great departments of government under our Constitution. At least, the Court has recognized that there is a boundary line.
In the equally important sister field, having to do with reposing judicial
power in such agencies, we are still not only without any semblance of a
boundary line but are actually faced with a disheartening maze of conflicting
notions as to where that line should be drawn and at times even with doubts
as to whether any line exists.
In its opinions in these two cases last year, the Supreme Court of the
United States declared for the first time in positive terms that there are
bounds which Congress may not transgress in delegating legislative power
to the Executive. Superficially, it seems strange that we have waited so long
for judicial repair of this essential but somewhat damaged pillar in our
national structure. The doctrine of separation of governmental powers into
legislative, executive and judicial is one feature of our Constitution that
cannot rightly be blamed on the laissez-faire philosophy of poor old Adam
Smith. The doctrine was written into our fundamental law plainly enough,
* This is a revision of an address made before a meeting of the Judicial Section of the
American Bar Association, the National Conference of Judicial Councils and the Special
Committee on Administrative Law, at Los Angeles, Cal., July 17, 1935. It has been annotated and brought up to date.
-A. B., 1913, Amherst College; A. M., LL. B., 1916, Northwestern University; member
and past chairman of the Special Committee on Administrative Law of the American Bar
Association; chairman of the Standing Committee on Radio Law, 1928-1929, and of the
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2. A. L. A. Schechter v. United States, 295 U. S. 723 (1935).
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and, as we know from authoritative sources, this was done deliberately and
for reasons which seemed good and sufficient to the master builders of the
Republic. It has been given unqualified recognition by the Supreme Court
of the United States in a number of decisions. 3 The claim that Montesquieu
erred in his appreciation of this feature of the English constitution would
seem to be as fully outlawed as the claim that the Supreme Court has no
power to invalidate legislation.
If the doctrine of separation of governmental powers is erroneous it still
constitutes one of the essential lines of our governmental structure and,
if it is to be done away with, it should be by amendment in such fashion that
the electorate will understand the issue on which it is voting. The issue will
not be whether we desire to substitute a new social and economic philosophy
for an old; it will be whether we are prepared to dispense with our principal
safeguard against autocracy in government. Let me digress here to say that
I do not think we should go back to the days of the Tudors and the Stuarts
for precedents on the powers of the Executive or even to the period of one
hundred years ago when you can still find vestiges of the autocratic theory
of government. It is not difficult to find vestiges even in later years. One
purpose of our Constitution, I take it, was to prevent a repetition of institutions such as the Star Chamber.
A certain amount of delegation of legislative power to executive officials
took place as far back as in the first administration of George Washington,
on a small scale, however, and for the most part not of such character as to
cause public concern. One writer has counted nineteen such delegations
(some, of them a little dubious) in the first volume of our federal statutes
covering a period of about ten years. 4 As we know, the process did not
assume substantial proportions until almost a century later and it was only
recently that the floodgates broke loose. Now, instead of nineteen, we find
on the statute books (at the last count) about thirteen hundred separate
instances where Congress has turned over the power to enact laws to executive and administrative agencies. Many of these delegations are narrow
in scope; many are disturbingly broad; some are without intelligible limit.
Until February, 1933, in the few cases that came before it on the subject, 5 the Supreme Court seemed a little reluctant to call a spade a spade;
3. E. 9., see Evans v. Gore, 253 U. S. 245 (192o); Springer v. Philippine Islands,
277 U. S. i89 (1928); O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U. S. 516, 530 (1933); in
addition, of course, see the Panama Refining Co. and Schechter cases. See also Humphrey v.
United States, 295 U. S. 6o2 (1935).
4. GOMER, LEGsLIsivE FUNCTIONS OF NATIONAL ADMNISTRATIvE AUTHoRrriEs

(1927) 50.

5. See, for example, The Aurora, 7 Cranch 382 (U. S. 1813) ; Field v. Clark, I43 U. S.
649 (1892); Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U. S. 470 (1904); Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United
States, 276 U. S. 394 (1928). See, however, the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Holmes in
Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U. S. 18, 210 (1928), in which he stated: "It is said that
the powers of Congress cannot be delegated, yet Congress has established the Interstate
Commerce Commission, which does legislative, judicial and executive acts, only softened by

a quasi."
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the same was true of courts generally, federal and state. Instead, a variety
of euphemisms appeared in judicial opinions. When the courts encountered
delegated legislative functions, they baptized them "administrative" or
"quasi-legislative" or even "quasi-judicial", terms that gave the impression
of representing something new in governmental processes and, in fact, led
many lawyers, judges and writers on legal subjects to believe that the impression was well founded. 5" In truth, they represent something almost as old as
government itself. I venture to say that one of the chief obstacles to clear
thinking in the field of administrative law has been this tendency to blink at
the facts.
In February, 1933, when our government under the Constitution was
i44 years old, the Supreme Court first discarded the euphemisms and called
a delegation of legislative power by its right name.6 In the case in which
this happened, it upheld the particular statute before it, saying, in realistic
fashion, that a certain amount of delegation is all right; the process is perfectly constitutional if you do not go too far. We all recognize that this
must be so. The necessities of government business require it, particularly
for the making of detailed regulations in highly specialized fields such as the
technical operation of radio stations or the importation of honey bees or the
shipment of insects-fields which require the continuous participation of
experts in the making of the law. 7 The euphemisms having been discarded
and the process having been recognized for what it is, the way was cleared
for placing limitations on how far it might be carried without doing violence
to the essential purpose of the constitutional prescription. In a sense, the
decision in 1933 opened the way for the decisions in 1935.
Unfortunately, however, even at this late date, no decisions of the
Supreme Court have established corresponding metes and bounds for an
approach to the equally important sister problem: how far may Congress go
in commingling judicial power with executive and legislative powers? Of
course, Congress really does not "delegate" judicial power at all (it has none
to delegate), but the term is occasionally more convenient than certain
clumsy, though more accurate, circumlocutions. The fact is that in most
discussions of the doctrine of separation of governmental powers there has
been altogether too much emphasis on the word "delegate" and too little on
the "basic and vital" object of the doctrine, which is "to preclude a commingling of these essentially different powers of government in the same
hands." 7a Daily the executive officials of the federal government delegate
5a. See SHORT, NATIONAL ADMNIsT.TrAvz ORGANIZATION (1923) 22, 23.
6. Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co. v. United States, 288 U. S. 294, 305 (i933).
7. This point of view has been consistently subscribed to by the Special Committee on
Administrative Law. See, for example, its 1934 report, 59 A. B. A. REP. 543, 563.
7a. O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U. S. s16, 530 (1933). In Jones v. Securities &
Exchange Comm., 56 Sup. Ct. 654, 657 (1936), the majority opinion, in discussing arbitrary

power, said the following: "To escape assumptions of such power on the part of the three
primary departments of the government is not enough.

Our institution must be kept free
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the performance of functions assigned to them by act of Congress to
subordinates in their employ, without encountering any constitutional obstacle. Similarly, Congress might conceivably delegate its power to legislate
on a particular subject-matter to a board responsible directly to Congress
and, if it did not also endow such board with executive or judicial power
over the same subject-matter, it would not run afoul of the doctrine of
separation of governmental powers, however badly it might bruise the
maxim delegatus non potest delegare. The latter is an entirely different
doctrine which has on occasions been read into the Constitution as if it were
7
one and the same thing as the former. b
The point cannot be made too frequently that what has come to be
known as "administrative law" in the United States results primarily from
departures, large or small, from the strict interpretation of the doctrine of
the separation of governmental powers. As stated in the first report of the
Special Committee on Administrative Law in its 1933 report,
the conclusion is difficult to avoid that administrative tribunals
represent departures, varying in degree and kind, from a rigid application of this doctrine, in fact if not in constitutional theory. The committee makes this statement, not in any spirit of criticism or disapproval, but in order to facilitate a simple analysis of the subject matter
with which it expects to deal.
"In general, it may be said that administrative law results from
the reposing of what are essentially legislative or judicial functions
(or both) in an official or board belonging to the executive branch of
the government or in an independent official or board." 7P
By way of contrast to the comparatively modern state of affairs that
now obtains on the legislative side of administrative law, we are still in the
from the appropriation of unauthorized power by lesser agencies as well. And if the various
administrative bureaus and commissions, necessarily called and being called into existence by
the increasing complexities of our modern business and political affairs, are permitted gradually to extend their powers by encroachments--even petty encroachments-upon the fundamental rights, privileges and immunities of the people, we shall in the end, while avoiding
the fatal consequences of a supreme autocracy, become submerged by a multitude of minor
invasions of personal rights, less destructive but not less violative of constitutional guaranties."
The rapid growth in the exercise of inquisitorial functions by administrative agencies
suggests an interesting study, from the point of view of the doctrine of separation of governmental powers. What has actually been occurring has been largely obscured by the
tendency to commingle executive, legislative and judicial functions in a single agency. In a
judicial proceeding, the issues are usually fixed, and any inquisition to compel disclosures is
limited accordingly. When the inquisitorial process was extended so as to serve as an aid
in performing legislative functions, the issues became vague indeed, and all too often the
process was really employed as a fishing expedition in order to find the basis for a criminal
prosecution. More recently, it seems, the tendency has been to seek to use the inquisitorial
process openly in aid of purely executive functions, and, in particular, to secure information
on which to base prosecutions. The wholesale seizure of private telegrams by the Federal
Communications Commission in cooperation with the Black Committee seems to be an
instance where the process has been carried at least this far.
7b. See F.AxxrFuRTR AND DAVISON, CASES oN ADmINISTRATIVE LAW (1935), Part II,
entitled "Delegation of Powers," for a collection of authorities on the maxim.
7c. (1933) 58 A. B. A. Rep., 409-410.
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euphemism stage on the judicial side. No decision to date 8 has frankly
faced the fact that, under a bewildering medley of federal statutes, judicial
functions galore have been lodged in the President, in agencies directly responsible to the President, in the heads of government departments, in subordinate officials and bureaus in those departments, and in the so-called
independent boards and commissions (the word "independent" is also somewhat of an euphemism).
Many persons have amused themselves by
attempting to count the instances of such delegations. No two reach exactly
the same result and, unless Congress has a slump in its recent large annual
output, no count will remain accurate for the time necessary to get it published. Much depends on definitions. It must be conceded that there are
boundary-line cases difficult to classify; some shade over from judicial into
executive and some from judicial into legislative. The fact that there are twilight zones between the three great departments of government is, of course,
nothing new and offers no excuse for attempting to obliterate their essential
differences. It would be just as reasonable to say that there should be no
law at all. My most recent count (which, frankly, may be open to criticism
for including some doubtful cases) indicates that there are about seventythree administrative tribunals in the federal government performing judicial
functions in about 267 classes of cases. Some of these tribunals, needless to
say, operate in very narrow fields but are none the less important to those
persons subject to their jurisdiction.
At times the Supreme Court has called these functions "administrative",
at others, "quasi-judicial", at others, "quasi-legislative". 9 It has called some
of the tribunals "legislative courts." 10 As a result of this policy of nonrecognition, there is no decision placing intelligible limits on the extent to
which the process of commingling judicial power with executive power and
8. For an interesting decision of a lower federal court, see Western Union Tel. Co. v.
Myatt, 98 Fed. 335, 354 (C. C. D. Kan. 1899).
See also the majority decision in the Guffey Coal Act cases (Carter v. Carter Coal Co.,
U. S. Sup. Ct. May i8, 1936), with respect to the attempt by Congress to delegate the power
to fix hours and wages to a majority of the producers and miners. The majority said:
"This is legislative delegation in its most obnoxious form; for it is not even delegation to an
official or an official body, presumptively disinterested, but to private persons whose interests
may be and often are adverse to the interests of others in the same business. The delegation is so clearly arbitrary and so clearly a denial of rights safeguarded by the due process
clause of the Fifth Amendment, that it is unnecessary to do more than refer to decisions of
this court which foreclose the question. Schechter Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. at p.
537; Eubank v. Richmond, 226 U. S. 137, 143; Seattle Trust Company v. Roberge, 278
U. S. ii6, 121-122." See also Gibson Auto Co. v. Finnegan, 217 Wis. 401, 259 N. W. 42o
(1936) ; It re Petition of State of Wisconsin and the Tavern Code Authority, Wis. Sup. Ct.,
Jan. 7, 1936.
9. Among the many decisions of this character, see Federal Radio Commission v. General Electric Co., 281 U. S. 464 (193o); Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, 279 U. S. 716 (1929) ; Ex Parte Bakelite Corporation, 279 U. S. 438 (I929) ; Willing v. Chicago Auditorium Ass'n, 277 U. S. 274 (1928) ; Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Grannis,
273 U. S. 70 (1927) ; Posturn Cereal Co. v. California Fig Nut Co., 272 U. S. 693, 700
(927) ; Keller v. Potomac Electric Power Co., 261 U. S. 428, 444 (1923); Butterworth v.
United States, 112 U. S. 50 (1884).
io. See Williams v. United States, 289 U. S. 553, 56o (i933) ; EX parte Bakelite Corporation, 279 U. S. 438, 44o (I929).
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legislative power may be carried. Our citizens are daily doing business with
de facto political entities which have not been formally recognized, at least
by their right names. But it seems clear that another essential pillar of our
national structure is somewhat damaged and is in need of repair.
It is on this subject of commingling judicial power with other powers
that, in all humility, the Special Committee on Administrative Law of the
American Bar Association has proposed a method of repair-the establishment of a federal administrative court. To appreciate the problem that
must be met, and to understand the limitations into which any attempted
solution must be made to fit, more must be said about the existing agencies
and the situation created by past decisions of the Supreme Court.
I need not dwell at length on the evils created by the mere multiplicity
of these agencies-the innumerable varieties of rules of practice and procedure, the countless different ways of taking depositions and of compelling the
attendance of witnesses and the production of documents, the bedlam of conditions on admission to practice and disbarment, the bewildering dissimilarities in the method and scope of judicial review, the lack of accessibility to
decisions, the overlapping jurisdiction, the ever-increasing centralization in
Washington, and the tendency of each agency to make decisions in its own
field without adequate appreciation of the effect of those decisions on persons
and businesses not directly subject to its regulation. Commissions are always
actuated by the philosophy of rugged individualism vis-a-vis each other. The
eradication of these and related evils seems difficult, indeed, as long as we
maintain our present federal circus with some seventy-three side-shows
housed in separate tents. We must find a way by which at least some of the
side-shows may gradually be brought into one large tent.
On the other hand, the moment we talk about doing so we encounter a
serious obstacle of a practical order. The opinion is widely held that, on the
judicial side as well as on the legislative side, there is need for the continuous
supervision of a body of experts dealing exclusively with a given class of
cases which, it is said, the courts have neither the time, the ability nor the
experience to handle. Personally, I think the notion rests on a misapprehension and proceeds primarily from a confusion of legislative functions with
judicial functions. I have already conceded that the making of regulations
in a technical field may well require delegated legislative power to a bureau
of experts, but I have yet to see the case in which an alleged violation of one
of those regulations involved issues any more difficult than are faced daily
by every court in the land. Like the climate of Los Angeles, theoretically
this conception of expert commissions, is perfect. Sometimes, it is true,
experts are appointed, but no more than you would expect under the law of
averages. Most of the appointees naturally achieve familiarity with the
subject-matter after they have served a substantial time. So do judges
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assigned to hear a particular class of litigation, e. g., divorce cases. However
this may be, the committee has recognized the possibility of merit in this
opinion and the practical necessity of compromise with those who entertain
it, if it is to achieve any measure of success toward its main objective. The
practical problem, therefore, becomes two-fold and somewhat paradoxical
-to achieve uniformity without sacrificing the alleged advantages of multiplicity.
So far I have spoken as if there were no decisions of the Supreme Court
to be reckoned with. The task would be somewhat simplified if there were
not. As I understand the Court's decisions in the PanamaRefining Company and the Schechter cases, a delegation of legislative power, to be valid
under the Constitution, (i) must be limited by a sufficiently definite legislative standard expressed in the statute, and (2) may not be exercised except
on the basis of appropriate findings required to be made by the administrative
agency. In the past, including the very recent past, the Court has made
exactly the same requirements of delegations of judicial power, although it
has not called them by name. Instances of this are its decisions under the
Federal Trade Commission Act and under the Radio Act of 1927.11
Heartily as I concur in the results of the recent decisions, I cannot
believe that these requirements mean very much. If, to make an otherwise
invalid delegation of legislative power valid, all you have to do is to insert
some word or phrase such as "fair" or "reasonable", or "public interest,
convenience, or necessity," and a requirement that there be findings of fact
showing that the standard has been complied with, 12 then, it seems to me, the
essential meaning of the doctrine of separation of governmental powers has
been missed and its evasion becomes simple indeed, while at the same time
the legitimate field for delegations of legislative power, and the good purposes
served by delegations within that field, are given little or no recognition.
ii. Federal Radio Comm. v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortgage Co., 289 U. S. 266 (i933);
Federal Trade Comm. v. Raladam Co., 283 U. S. 643 (I931), and cases therein cited.
12. A counterpart of this process of reasoning is to be found in the tendency of Congress
to attempt to give itself power to legislate on a given subject matter by extensive recitals in
a preamble to, or the first section of, a statute. Among the many recent examples are the
National Industrial Recovery Act, the Agricultural Adjustment Act and the Guffey Coal
Act. Some color of authority for this procedure seems to be given by Chicago Board of
Trade v. Olsen, 262 U. S. I (1923), when taken in conjunction with Hill v. Wallace, 259
U. S. 44 (1922). Such recitals of fact, it seems to me, should be made in the reports of
legislative committees, who have held hearings and heard evidence on the need for the legislation, and not in the legislation itself. Recently the Supreme Court, in St. Joseph Stock
Yards Co. v. United States, 56 Sup. Ct. 720, 730 (1936), has, in its majority opinion, spoken as
follows on this subject: "When the legislature acts directly, its action is subject to judicial
scrutiny and determination in order to prevent the transgression of these limits of power.
The legislature cannot preclude that scrutiny or determination by any declaration or legislative finding. Legislative declaration or finding is necessarily subject to independent
judicial review upon the facts and the law by courts of competent jurisdiction to the end
that the Constitution as the supreme law of the land may be maintained. Nor can the
legislature escape the constitutional limitation by authorizing its agent to make findings
that the agent has kept within that limitation."
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Certainly Congress cannot delegate all its legislative power to a commission and then go home, no matter how elaborate a standard is set up as a
torch to guide the commission in the meantime. Is not the real point to be
found in a requirement that delegation of legislative power be in relatively
narrow and specialized fields which, as a practical matter, could not successfully be handled by Congress? Can any one say that these so-called standards really mean anything that would not be read into the statutes in any
event?

12a

On the judicial side, these requirements appear more appropriate and to
serve a legitimate purpose. They fall far short, however, of achieving the
essential purpose served by keeping the judicial separate from the executive
and the legislative departments of government. If there is anything of
which we can be relatively sure after some hundreds, even thousands, of
years of experience with judicial machinery, it is that no man can be trusted
to be judge in his own case.12 b And he is a judge in his own case if he is also
the prosecutor or if he is also the legislator who made the rule he is asked
to interpret and apply. Agency after agency in our federal government is
authorized to wield all three powers of government at once. Wearing its
legislative toga, a commission makes a regulation, on compliance with which
John Doe's right to continue in business may depend. Having reason to
isa. Whatever may be thought as to the conclusions reached by Mr. Justice Cardozo
in his dissenting opinion in Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388, 433 (935), and in
his concurring opinion in A. L. A. Schechter v. United States, 295 U. S. 495, 551 (935), I am
inclined to think his opinion goes farther in the direction of suggesting a workable rule than
does the majority opinion. In the Panama Refining Co. case, at 443, he said, in support of
his conclusion that there was sufficient definition of a standard: "Discretion is not unconfined and vagrant. It is canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing. , . . What
can be done under cover of that permission is closely and clearly circumscribed both as to
subject matter and occasion." In the Schechter case at 551, applying the same test, he found
that here "is an attempted delegation not confined to any single act nor to any class or group
of acts identified or described by reference to a standard."
I regret that space does not permit a discussion of the suggestions made in the Report
ef the Committee on Mitisters' Powers (the Sankey Committee) (1932). Contrary to an
impression rather generally promulgated, this Committee did not give wholesale approval
of the modem tendency toward broad delegation of legislative power but, on the contrary,
observed "dangerous tendencies" and "risks of abuse," against which "safeguards are required." It recommended that Parliament should confine itself to the delegation of "normal"
powers and should not, as a rule, delegate "exceptional" powers. As examples of "exceptional" powers it enumerated powers to legislate on matters of principle or to impose taxation, power to amend existing legislation, powers conferring so wide a discretion that it is
almost impossible to know the limit intended, and powers over the exercise of which
judicial control is forbidden. The report contained a number of other recommendations
designed to remedy evils due to the fact that "the methods by which those powers have
been delegated are open to serious criticism." To say that the report constitutes a refutation of HrwAu.r's THrE Nmv DEsPomTsm (i929), is an enormous exaggeration.
i2b. See note 17a infra. In his dissenting opinion in St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v.
United States, 56 Sup. Ct. 720, 726 (1936), Mr. Justice Brandeis said: "The inexorable
safeguard which the due process clause assures is not that a court may examine whether
the findings as to value or income are correct, but that the trier of the facts shall be an impartial tribunal; that no finding shall be made except upon due notice and opportunity to be
heard; that the procedure at the hearings shall be consistent with the essentials of a fair
trial; and that it shall be conducted in such a way that there will be opportunity for a
court to determine whether the applicable rules of law and procedure were observed."
(Italics added.) See, however, Brinkley v. Hassig, C. C. A. ioth, April 7, 1936, quoted
htfra note 17.
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believe that John Doe is guilty of violating the regulation, the commission
doffs the toga and, taking up the executive sceptre, investigates and prosecutes
him. With the sceptre still in its hand, the commission hurriedly dons the
judicial ermine and proceeds to present to itself at least two scintillas of
evidence to prove that it was right in the first place. While care is sometimes
taken to preserve the form of placing the burden of proof on the prosecutor,
all the form in the world cannot disguise the fact that the burden is usually
on John Doe to prove himself innocent before a commission that at least
strongly suspects he is guilty. If John or his lawyer construes the regulation
differently than does the commission, that is just unfortunate for John. The
commission made the regulation and is confident that it knows just what it
meant to say.1 3 And it is always free to change its mind. John is in the
position of a man whose wife changes her system of bidding in the middle
of a bridge game without notice. He is sure to lose and is equally sure to get
blamed for it.
Important as is the matter of imposing proper limits on the delegation
of legislative power, the matter of imposing limits on the reposing of
judicial power in agencies that have executive or legislative power (or both)
seems to me more important-at least if the individual is to be left with
any protection at all against arbitrary, capricious or corrupt public officials.
After all, in a democracy legislation is bound to be a partisan process, sometimes pursuant to a party platform and sometimes not, but usually under
the leadership of a group that has, or claims to have, an objective. It is so
in Congress, and we have no reason to be shocked if it is so of officials in
the executive departments and the independent agencies to which legislative
power has been delegated.Y3a If regulations made in the exercise of such a
power are enforced uniformly against all persons, regardless of party, we
need not fear too much from the results. A bad regulation, like a bad statute, will be repealed soon enough if it is enforced. But if power is given to
13. One encouraging limitation on the power of administrative tribunals to act simultaneously in a dual capacity has been pointed out by the Supreme Court in Arizona Grocery
Co. v. Atchison, Topeka & S. F. R. Co., 284 U. S. 370, 389 (1932): "Where, as in this case,
the Commission has made an order having a dual aspect, it may not in a subsequent proceeding, acting in its quasi-judicial capacity, ignore its own pronouncement promulgated, in its
quasi-legislative capacity and retroactively repeal its own enactment as to the reasonableness
of the rate it has prescribed." "The Commission's error arose from a failure to recognize
that when it prescribed a maximum reasonable rate for the future it was performing a legislative function, and that when it was sitting to award reparation it was sitting for a purpose
judicial in its nature. In the second, capacity, while not bound by the rule of res judicata,

it was bound to recognize the validity of the rule of conduct prescribed by it and not to repeal
its own enactment with retroactive effect. It could repeal the order as it affected future
action, and substitute a new rule of conduct as often as occasion might require, but this was
obviously the limit of its power, as of that of the legislature itself."
See also the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the Guffey Coal Act cases (Carter
v. Carter Coal Co., U. S. Sup. Ct., May 18, 1936), in which the effect of legislative recitals
by way of inducement is considered in the majority opinion.

13a. "Legislative agencies, with varying qualifications, work in a field peculiarly exposed to political demands. Some may be expert and impartial, others subservient."
Majority opinion in St. Joseph Stock Yards v. United States, 56 Sup. Ct. 720, 728 (1936).
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the same agency to discriminate without too much danger of detection-to
enforce the regulation against A and to overlook B's transgressions, whether
for friendship or because of some form of political pressure or on account
of any of the countless frailties of human nature, there you will find tyranny
of the bureaucrat over the individual, a return to the jurisprudence of the
Arabian sheik. And that is exactly what you have when judicial power is
combined with legislative and executive power in an administrative agency,
and that agency, in turn, is composed of men who must periodically look to
the Executive and to the Senate for reappointment and a continuation of
their source of livelihood. As stated by Alexander Hamilton in the Federalist Papers (and quoted by the Supreme Court in Evans v. Gore,i 4 and
O'Donoghuev. Uited States 15) :

"In the general course of human nature, a power over man's
subsistence amounts to a power over his will."
So far as I know, not a single federal decision declares or even hints that
it is unconstitutional to combine judge with prosecutor or legislator,"6 and
there are many decisions which can be cited as giving tacit approval to that
combination. 17 If there is any one purpose more than another which a
majority of the Special Committee on Administrative Law have had in mind
in proposing an administrative court, it is to segregate the clearly judicial
functions of these agencies from their executive and legislative functions
and, so far as possible, to restore the exercise of those functions to an inde17a
pendent judiciary.
14. 253 U. S. 245, 252 (1920).
15. 289 U. S. 516, 531 (933).

16. A possible exception to this is found in Western Union Tel. Co. v. Wyatt, 98 Fed. 335,
354 (C. C. D. Kan. I89).
17. See, for example, Federal Trade Commission v. Klesner, 28o U. S. 19, 27 (1929).
See, also, the very recent case of Brinkley v. Hassig. C. C. A. ioth, April 7, 1936, involving
a revocation of license to practice medicine by the Kansas State Medical Board. The
opinion contains the following:
"The spectacle of an administrative tribunal acting as both prosecutor and judge has
been the subject of much comment, and efforts to do away with such practice have been
studied for years. The Board of Tax Appeals is an outstanding example of one such successful effort. But it has never been held that such procedure denies constitutional right.
On the contrary, many agencies have functioned for years, with the approval of the courts,
which combine these roles. The Federal Trade Commission investigates charges of business
immorality, files a charge in its own name as plaintiff, and then decides whether the proof
sustains the charges it has preferred. The Interstate Commerce Commission and state
public service commissions may prefer complaints to be tried before themselves. If an
administrative tribunal may on its own initiative investigate, file a complaint, and then try
the charge so preferred, due process is not denied here because one or more members of
the board aided in the investigation."
ira. Again it is a matter of regret that space does not permit a detailed discussion of
the findings and recommendations contained in the Report of the Committee on Ministers'
Powers (1932), 74, already referred to supra note I2a. The report finds "it is beyond doubt
that there are certain canons of judicial conduct to which all tribunals and persons who
have to give judicial or quasi-judicial decisions ought to conform."
Among these canons is the following: "The first and most fundamental principle of
natural justice is that a man may not be a judge in his own case." Id. at 76.
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Curiously enough, the chief obstacle to a complete restoration is found
in decisions of the Supreme Court itself. It has taken some of its own
euphemisms too seriously. Having found that certain functions were "quasijudicial" or "quasi-legislative" or "administrative," it has later reasoned that
ergo those functions cannot be judicial and cannot be exercised by constitutional courts or, on review, by the Supreme Court.1 8 The line is usually
drawn between issues of fact and issues of law (find it if you can).19 The
court has held that decisions on issues of fact by federal administrative agencies, or at least certain kinds of such agencies, cannot be reviewed by a constitutional court when they are supported by more than a scintilla of evidence.
Yet in nearly every administrative controversy, as in most lawsuits, the principal issues are of fact, and most instances of arbitrariness and caprice in
administrative decisions consist in disregarding the great weight of the
evidence in order to favor the less deserving of the two parties to the dispute.
Disqualifying interest, said the Committee, is not confined to pecuniary interest. "Indeed we think it is clear that bias from strong and sincere conviction as to public policy may
operate as a more serious disqualification than pecuniary interest . . .
"We are of opinion that, in considering the assignment of judicial functions to Ministers,
Parliament should keep clearly in view the maxim that no man is to be judge in a cause in
which he has an interest . . .
"It is unfair to impose on a practical administrator the duty of adjudicating in any
matter in which it could fairly be argued that his impartiality would be in inverse ratio to
his strength and ability as a Minister . . ." Id. at 78.
There follows a detailed series of recommendations which, in substance, recommend
the establishment of a number of independent tribunals analogous to the Board of Tax
Appeals and recommend against the establishment of a system of administrative law and
administrative judges analogous to the French system (a system in which, unlike the proposal of the Special Committee on Administrative Law, no appeal would lie to the ordinary
courts).
18. See, for example, Federal Radio Comm. v. General Electric Co., 281 U. S. 464
(1930).

i9. The Supreme Court has, of course, recognized that, in certain classes of cases at
least, there is a line which may not be transgressed, even on issues of fact. The line has been
established with respect to so-called "jurisdictional" fact, and to matters of constitutional right.
In Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22, 56 (1932), for example, the Court said: "The recognition of the utility and convenience of administrative agencies for the investigation and finding of facts within their proper province, and the support of their authorized action, does not
require the conclusion that there is no limitation of their use, and that the Congress could
completely oust the courts of all determinations of fact by vesting the authority to make
them with finality in its own instrumentalities or in the Executive Department. That would
be to sap the judicial power as it exists under the Federal Constitution, and to establish a
government of a bureaucratic character alien to our system, wherever fundamental rights
depend, as not infrequently they do depend, upon the facts, and finality as to facts becomes
in effect finality in law." More recently, in St. Joseph Stock Yards Case, the Court (majority opinion) said at 729: "But to say that their findings of fact may be made conclusive
where constitutional rights of liberty and property are involved, although the evidence
clearly establishes that the findings are wrong and constitutional rights have been invaded,
is to place those rights at the mercy of administrative officials and seriously to impair the
security inherent in our judicial safeguards.
"That prospect, with our multiplication of administrative agencies, is not one to be
lightly regarded. It is said that we can retain judicial authority to examine the weight of
evidence when the question concerns the right of personal liberty. But if this be so, it is
not because we are privileged to perform our judicial duty in that case and for reasons of
convenience to disregard it in others. The principle applies when rights either of person or
of property are protected by constitutional restrictions. Under our system there is no warrant for the view that the judicial power of a competent court can be circumscribed by any
legislative arrangement designed to give effect to administrative action going beyond the
limits of constitutional authority."
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Where the prosecutor is also the judge, the individual needs the protection of
the courts far more on issues of fact than he does on issues of law.
Perhaps we have all been unconsciously affected by a habit of thinking
due to an institution more or less peculiar to Anglo-Saxon jurisprudencethe jury.1 1a Under this jurisprudence the exercise of judicial functions on
the law side has been apportioned between two bodies, the court and the jury.
It is fair to state, I think, that the institution of jury trial is due, not to
any notion on the part of our English forefathers that issues of fact are
not judicial, but rather to their deep-rooted belief in the doctrine of separation of governmental powers. The Englishman distrusted the judges because they were appointed and, he believed, controlled by the King. He
wanted issues of fact (and also some issues of law) adjudicated by independent umpires free from control by the Executive. We, in turn, imbedded
the right of jury trial in our federal and state constitutions not altogether
appreciating, I am afraid, that the essential thing was to have independent
judges on issues of fact and not that issues of fact are not for the judiciary.
iga. This appears in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Brandeis in the St. Joseph
Stock Yards Case, at 737, in which he said, speaking of earlier decisions of the Court:
and, they draw distinctions, which give clear indication when due process requires
judicial process and when it does not.
"The first distinction is between issues of law and issues of fact. When dealing with
constitutional rights (as distinguished from privileges accorded by the Government, United
States v. Babcock, 250 U. S. 328, 331) there must be the opportunity of presenting in an
appropriate proceeding, at some time, to some court, every question of law raised, whatever
the nature of the right invoked or the status of him who claims it. The second distinction
is between the right to liberty of person and other constitutional rights. Compare Phillips
v. Commissioner, 283 U. S. 589, 596-597. A citizen who claims that his liberty is being
infringed is entitled, upon habeas corpus, to the opportunity of a judicial determination of
the facts. . . But a multitude of decisions tells us that when dealing with property a
much more liberal rule applies. They show that due process of law does not always entitle
an owner to have the correctness of findings of fact reviewed by a court, . . ." Further
on, at 739, he said that the Court "has recognized that there is a limit to the capacity of
judges; and that the magnitude of the task imposed upon them, if there be granted judicial
review of the correctness of findings of such facts as value and income, may prevent prompt
and faithful performance. It has borne in mind that even in judicial proceedings the findings of fact is left, by the Constitution, in large part to laymen. It has enquired into the
character of the administrative tribunal provided and the incidents of its procedure. Compare Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U. S. 6o2, 628."
It is interesting to note how, in this dissenting opinion as in so many opinions of the
Court, no distinction is made between the exercise of a legislative function (e. g., rate-making
as involved in that case) and the exercise of a judieial function (e.g., an award of reparations, or the revocation of a license for violation of a regulation, or the entry of a ceaseand-desist order after finding a person guilty of a specified unfair method of competition).
It is also interesting to contrast Mr. Justice Brandeis' conception of the supremacy of the
law, with that of Mr. Justice Sutherland speaking for the majority of the Court in Jones v.
Securities and Exchange Commission, 56 Sup. Ct. 654, 66o (1936). The former's conception is expressed as follows: "The supremacy of law demands that there shall be opportunity to have some court decide whether an erroneous rule of law was applied; and
whether the proceeding in which facts were adjudicated was conducted regularly." The
latter's conception is as follows: "The action of the commission finds no support in right,
principle or in law. It is wholly unreasonable and arbitrary. It violates the cardinal precept upon which the constitutional safeguards of personal liberty ultimately rest-that this
shall be a government of laws-because to the precise extent that the mere will of an
official or an official body is permitted to take the place of allowable official discretion or to
supplant the standing law as a rule of human conduct, the government ceases to be one of
laws and becomes an autocracy."

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

The paradox is that the decision of issues of fact, originally removed as far
as possible from the Executive, is now thrown bodily into the lap of executive officials and the court-house doors are closed to them. Something has
20
been rendered unto Caesar that never belonged to Caesar.
Take the Federal Trade Commission as an example of the curious
paradoxes into which we have been led. Prior to 1914 there had been a
hue and cry against what were vaguely termed unfair methods of competition. Congress wanted to prohibit something but was not quite sure what
it was expected to prohibit. So it fired a sawed-off shotgun at the side of
a barn, forbade all unfair methods of competition, and set up a Federal
Trade Commission as a body of experts to ascertain just how much of the
barn had been hit. Its decisions were made subject to review in the several
circuit courts of appeals, on questions of law only. What has been the
result? On issues of fact (on which the individual had most need of protection, and which the Commission was least qualified to decide) the Commission reigned supreme. On the important issue of law as to what constitutes an unfair method of competition, we must today, after over twenty
years of the Commission, look chiefly to court decisions and not to the
decisions of this body of experts on the subject.2
Would it not have
been better to have endowed this commission with power to define "unfair
methods of competition" by rules and regulations, promulgated after notice
and hearing if you will-and then to have provided that violation of a regulation would constitute a penal offense, to be tried and determined in our
courts?

21a

2o. Dean Roscoe Pound, with his usual keen penetration, recognized the tendency as early
as i9o7. In his article Executive Justice (19o7) 55 U. OF PA. L. REv. 137, '39, he said: "A
brief review of the course of judicial decision for the past fifty years will show that the
judiciary has begun to fall into line, and that powers which fifty years ago would have been
held purely judicial and jealously guarded from executive exercise are now decided to be
administrative only and are cheerfully conceded to boards and commissions."
21. "It belongs to that class of phrases which does not admit of precise definition, but
the meaning and application of which must be arrived at by what this court elsewhere has
called 'the gradual process of judicial inclusion and exclusion'. Davidson v. New Orleans,
96 U. S. 97, 2O4. The question is one for the final determinations of the courts and not the
Commission. Federal Trade Comm. v. Gratz, 253 U. S. 421, 427; Federal Trade Comm. v.
Beech-Nut Packing Co., supra, p. 453." Federal Trade Comm. v. Raladam Co., 283 U. S.
643, 648 (931).
2Ia. See the able article, Handler, Unfair Competition (1936), 21 IowA L. REv. 175.
The author, a valued former member of the committee, in the concluding portion of his
article, at 185, writes: "The definition of unfair competition by administrative legislation
is incomparably superior to definition by administrative decision. The method of judicial
exclusion and inclusion does not permit of a sustained, consistent, comprehensive and speedy
attack upon the trade practice problem. The case by case determination takes years to
cover even a narrow field; it leaves wide lacunae; false starts are difficult to correct and
the erroneous decision is just as prolific as a sound ruling in begetting a progeny of subordinate rules. In a controversy between two litigants or between a Commission and a
private party, the law making function is distracted by factors which are important to the
contestants but irrelevant to the formulation of future policy. The fusion of law and
economics, the detailed investigations and hearings, and the precise formulation of rules,
all of which are so essential to a proper regulation of competition, are not feasible when
law making is but a by-product of the adjustment of controversies. The combination of
the two functions may have been justified when knowledge of the workings of competition
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Over five years ago, Mr. Chief Justice Hughes said:
"The power of administrative bodies to make findings of fact
which may be treated as conclusive, if there is evidence both ways, is
a power of enormous consequence. An unscrupulous administrator
might be tempted to say 'let me find the facts for the people of my
country, and I care little who lays down the general principles.' "22
This brings me to state another requirement that must be met by the
proposed administrative court. It must have full power to determine issues
of fact, either in the first instance or on review. Consequently, it cannot be
a constitutional court

23

and we must be very careful as to the method we

provide for ultimate review of its decisions by our constitutional courts.
It will be of assistance in appreciating the committee's proposal if I
outline the major classes of cases in which judicial functions are exercised
by administrative agencies, so as to make plain both how modest is its initial
program and how far-reaching is its ultimate purpose. It will also help
to make clear that the committee's proposal has only to do with clearly
judicial functions and that there is no ground for apprehension that it would
invade the traditional prerogatives of the Executive or that it would usurp
any legislative activities, including rate-making.
The first class of cases consists broadly of those involving money claims
or penalties. In this group would fall the cases now heard by the Board
of Tax Appeals, the Court of Claims, the Customs Court, and, on the
customs side, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals. All these are
already really courts in a genuine sense. The cases they hear are, to
some extent, exactly the same as certain classes of cases over which our
federal district courts have jurisdiction. None of them presents a combination of prosecutor or legislator with judge. The individual gets his day
in court before an independent judiciary, and, except for the members of the
Board of Tax Appeals, the judges have life tenure.
was sparse and objectives ill-defined.

It can no longer be justified today.

It would be

little short of criminal to rely upon so inefficient a method of law making when more
scientific and expeditious devices are unavailable.
"It is futile to expect the legislature to revise the statute to meet changing conditions
and needs. Hence we should resort to administrative legislation, at least so far as federal
control of practices in interstate commerce is concerned. The administrative tribunal would
have several functions. On the legislative or law making side, it would be charged with the
duty of maintaining an unremitting study of the trade practice problem. It would, by rules
and regulations, under a proper delegation of power and a clear definition of the standards
by which it is to be guided, make additions to the general code of unfair competition. These
additions would be preceded by investigation and public hearing and proposed drafts would
be subject to extended criticism and study before enactment.
"On the enforcement side, I should favor the conversion of the Federal Trade Commission into an administrative court with the authority, in the first instance, to issue binding injunctive orders. Prosecution should be completely divorced from the process of
adjudication."
22. U. S. Daily, Nov. i, i93o, at i.

2,3. Federal Radio Comm. v. General Electric Co., 281 U. S. 464 (193o).
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There is, however, an amazing number of other cases involving money
claims or penalties where these safeguards are partly or completely lacking.
Time will not permit anything like a full description of them. There are
instances in which executive officials have power to find the individual guilty
of this-or-that violation of a statute or regulation and to impose a fine.
The Secretary of Labor may, for example, impose a heavy fine on a steamship company for bringing a diseased, defective or otherwise inadmissible
alien into the United States if the condition of the alien might have been
ascertained with reasonable diligence. 24 There are the reparations cases
confided to the Interstate Commerce Commission and the Federal Communications Commission.
A second class of cases consists broadly of those which, if handled
in court, would be called injunction or mandamus cases. An illustration
of this is the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission to find an individual guilty of an unfair method of competition and to enter a cease-anddesist order against him (but not the jurisdiction of such bodies as the
Interstate Commerce Commission, the Federal Communications Commission, or the Secretary of Agriculture under the Packers and Stockyards Act
to fix rates).
A third class of cases which, I think, may prove to be the most important of all, includes those which I shall describe generally as revocationof -license cases. There are, as nearly as I can ascertain, about ioo instances
of federal statutes which require a license, permit or some other instrument
of authority as a prerequisite to engaging in a particular kind of business
undertaking or activity. In a large proportion of these instances the licensing authority has broad legislative power to make regulations with which the
licensee must comply, and broad judicial power to revoke the licenses and to
put the licensee out of business after trying him for violation of one of
its own regulations. It is unnecessary to recall that the recent unfortunate
N. I. R. A. had a one-year provision under which, if valid, the President
might have imposed the license system on practically every business in the
country, and that the similarly ill-fated Agricultural Adjustment Act had a
provision almost as broad. In both instances, judicial review of revocations
was almost completely eliminated.
The tendency to impose the license system on individuals and on businesses is visible everywhere. A number of bills now pending in Congress
would, if passed, extend the system or its equivalent into -new fields. Such
a system is the dream of every bureaucrat. It throws the machinery of
government into reverse gear so that the servant becomes the master. 25
24. Lloyd Sabaudo Societa Anonima v. Elting, 287 U. S. 329 (932).

25. At this point I have borrowed, with slight rephrasing, the language which I have
used in another article, Freedom of Speech and Radio Broadcasting (1935) i77 ANNALs 179.
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What has heretofore been a constitutional right to engage in an honorable
calling becomes a mere privilege held subject to the caprice of an administrative agency which combines legislative, executive and judicial powers with
no substantial recourse to the courts for protection. There is not a constitutional guaranty which cannot be evaded with impunity and laughed to
scorn by such a combination. Can any lawyer reasonably contend that
to try a man for violation of a regulation, to find him guilty, and to punish
him by taking away his right to earn his livelihood in his chosen calling, does
not constitute the exercise of a judicial function? To me, there is no field
in which there is greater need or occasion for the intervention of an independent judiciary with full sway over issues of both law and fact.
Now let us consider the machinery of the court which would be
established to exercise some or all of the judicial functions which I have
described.
The court envisioned by the Special Committee on Administrative Law
would consist of a chief justice and a number of associate justices (probably forty at the outset) to be determined by the scope and nature of the
functions assigned to it. All members of the court would hold office for life
or during good behavior. They would be appointed by the President, by
and with the advice and consent of the Senate, except that, so far as possible,
at the outset its members would consist of the present personnel of the
tribunals whose functions are taken over by the court.2 6 The salaries would
be reasonably commensurate with the salaries paid to judges of the United
States District Courts and the United States Circuit Court of Appeals, with
a somewhat higher salary for the chief justice. The provisions for retirement that apply to federal judges would apply to the administrative court
judges. They would not be removable from office by the Executive or by
any process other than impeachment. While, under decisions of the Supreme Court, this new tribunal could not achieve the dignity of a constitutional court, as much dignity and as much security and as much independence as is possible to provide by Act of Congress would be conferred upon it
and its members.
Up to this point there is not much leeway, I believe, for difference of
opinion or occasion for compromise. At any event, the committee would
probably be adamant, even obstinate, in insisting that judicial independence
is the bed-rock on which this court must be constructed and that without a
large measure of such independence we may question whether the labor and
the pain of the necessary adjustments are worthwhile. If this court's every
decision is to be blurted out under the shotgun of an executive power to
26. An exception may have to be made in the case of the Board of Tax Appeals. The

point has been made that Congress would have no power to convert their definite terms of
office into life tenure, and, if the point is well-taken, it would be necessary to take over members of the Board only for their unexpired terms.
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appoint or remove, or of a legislative power to refuse to confirm, then it will
fall far short of getting us back on the main road. So far as clothes can
make the court, the committee desires to outfit this court with judicial vestments as it starts on its career.
The committee is thinking in terms of an extremely flexible organization, under a chief justice with broad powers, but subject to appropriate
checks. The court would have two divisions-a trial division and an appellate division-and the statute would fix a minimum number of justices to be
assigned to either division. Subject to this, the chief justice would determine
these numbers and would assign the justices back and forth, all in such manner as most expeditiously to dispose of the court's work. No justice would,
of course, be allowed to review a case in an appellate capacity if he had had
to do with it in a trial capacity. Each division might well have a presiding
officer called a chairman.
The trial division would be subdivided into not less than four sections,
each composed of one or more justices. The chief justice would determine
the number of justices composing each section, the particular justices to be
assigned thereto, and the scope of the section's work, with power to make
any necessary changes from time to time. Each section would be assigned
a particular class of cases, or two or more related classes of cases and, until
changed, would have continuous supervision of the class or classes of cases
assigned to it. This would all be done in such a manner as to provide not
only for the expeditious disposal of the court's work, but also for the development of expert knowledge and experience in the handling of specialized
fields. Thus, we might eventually expect a tax section, a customs section, a
claims section, a patents section, a section dealing with unfair methods of
competition, a section dealing with revocations of license, and so on. At the
outset, temporary provision should be made for specific sections corresponding to the tribunals to be absorbed, so that there will be a minimum of disturbance. The flexibility of the section idea would make it possible to obviate
overlapping functions, to bring related functions together whenever necessary, and to meet peak loads of work in one section by drawing upon the
personnel of another section which is not so busy.
While the advantage of expert knowledge and experience in the handling
of specialized subject-matter would be retained, the advantage of reasonably
uniform rules of practice, procedure and evidence would be secured. The
matter of admission to the administrative bar and of disciplining wayward
members could be placed on an orderly and logical basis. These and other
advantages, which seem beyond hope of achievement with our present circus
of seventy-three side-shows, become within reach with a court so organized.
To what extent the appellate division would or should be subdivided into
sections, each limited to particular classes of cases, depends, of course, on
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how large a court is created and on what functions are assigned to it. In
the modest form proposed by the committee a multiplicity of sections of this
sort might not be desirable. There would be sections in the sense that not
more than three justices of the appellate division would participate in the
determination of any case reviewed by it, with provision, however, for a
procedure by which conflicts between two or more of these sections could
be resolved on motion for rehearing. The same sort of procedure could
also be employed in order to reduce the issues in any case to matters of law,
where any questions of law are involved, so as to put the case in such shape
that it may constitutionally be reviewed by the Supreme Court on petition
for certiorari. In other words, a motion for rehearing would serve as a
sifting process to protect the Supreme Court from being burdened with unimportant cases and at the same time to bring into bold relief the cases that do
involve important questions and deserve review by our highest court. The
majority of the committee are inclined to think that provision for review by
the Supreme Court on petition for certiorari is all that is necessary, but there
may be a difference of opinion on that. They believe that it is not desirable
that there be an appeal as a matter of right to the several circuit courts of
appeal (except, perhaps, in classes of cases where such an appeal as already
provided by statute) with the resulting conflict in decisions, the unavoidable
delay and expense, and the intervening uncertainty. If it were not for the
ambulatory features of the court, which I shall mention presently, the committee might feel otherwise, but it seems that it will not be difficult to avoid
the evil of having this court sit too regularly in Washington.
Incidentally, the appeal from the trial division to the appellate division
could be, and I think, ought to be, on as informal and as inexpensive a basis
as possible. Printing of the record could be dispensed with, and such matters
as the time within which appeal should be taken, and the formalities attending, would be governed by the coures rules.
While both the trial division and the appellate division would have headquarters in Washington, both divisions, and each section thereof, would be
ambulatory to the greatest extent practicable, with power to hold hearings
anywhere in the United States and, wherever the work of the court justifies
it, to establish either permanent or part-time branches in the larger cities. To
assist in this, the trial division would be empowered to employ examiners or
commissioners both regularly and, to meet unusually heavy demands, for
limited periods or for particular classes of cases.
Needless to say, a great deal depends on how large a court is established.
The smaller the court and the more restricted its functions, the greater the
extent to which it will have to operate at its headquarters in Washington.
The larger the court the more ambulatory it may become. Large or small,
however, it will, in this respect, offer opportunity for a vast improvement
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over the present situation. Seventy-three separate administrative agencies,
each with anywhere from one to sixteen members, and each with a narrow
field to work in, must all stay fairly close to their headquarters in the District
of Columbia. Such a system, or lack of system, inevitably leads to the maximum of concentration at the capital and a maximum of expense and a minimum of convenience for the persons regulated. Any combination of the
judicial functions of even two of them is in this respect a step forward.
Now I come to the subject which is by all odds the most troublesome,
and, I am afraid, the most controversial: What jurisdiction should be conferred upon this court at the outset? What federal administrative agencies
should be shorn of their judicial functions so that they may be conferred
upon this court? The members of the committee have, in the main, been
troubled only on the practical side; for the most part its members have been
in complete agreement that theoretically the new court should eventually
have all the several classes of cases I enumerated as judicial a moment ago.
In order that there may be no misapprehension, I want to mention two
classes of cases over which the committee would not confer original jurisdiction in the proposed court.
One class is the jurisdiction now exercised by those agencies that have
to do with the regulation and fixing of rates. The committee has never proposed, in fact it took pains in its 1934 report 27 to negative any intention of
proposing, that functions of this character, such as now exercised by the
Interstate Commerce Commission, the Federal Communications Commission,
the Shipping Board, and the Secretary of Agriculture under the Packers and
Stockyards Act, should be absorbed by the proposed court. These functions
either are, or come so close to being, legislative in character, that the committee agrees it would not be practicable or desirable to dislodge their exercise
27
in the first instance from the tribunals to which they are now delegated. a
This is not to say, however, that federal administrative rate-making machinery cannot be improved. The existing situation, in which a number of
rate-making agencies are operating on as many different theories as there are
agencies and with little or no reference to each other, certainly could be bet27. (1934) 59 A. B. A. REP. 539, 550.

27a. "The fixing of rates is a legislative act." St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United
States, 56 Sup. Ct. 720, 728 (1936). If the implications of this statement had been more
fully recognized and discussed in the majority and minority opinions, I have the feeling
that much of the clash between the two would have disappeared. Both opinions, however,
treat the legislative act of the Secretary of Agriculture in fixing a rate as exactly the same
thing juridically as the judicial act of the Secretary of Labor in excluding a person seeking

to enter the United States, after a finding that he has certain physical defects or that he has
been guilty of moral delinquency.

An interesting field for speculation is raised by the Township of Franklin v. Tugwell,
App. D. C. May i, 1936. The majority of the Court held that there had been an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the President, the only criterion or standard

provided by the Act being that the money be spent for "housing projects". If the function
thus delegated be considered legislative in character, it still is not of the sort which is
primarily discussed in this article. The issue rather seems to be the extent to which congress can divest itself of the control over the purse-strings vested in it by the Constitution.
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tered:- Something might be gained by eventually having them all subject to
review by a single tribunal such as the proposed administrative court, but
that is a question that does not have to be solved now.
Another class of cases with which the committee does not propose to
interfere is the jurisdiction now exercised by the galaxy of licensing agencies
in the federal government in the original issuance of licenses and renewals
of license. I have already stated that the committee regards the revocation
of a license as the exercise of a judicial function. Proceedings on applications for license or on applications for renewal of license (except, perhaps,
where used as a substitute for revocation proceedings) seem, however, to
belong to a somewhat different category. In a large proportion of cases the
issuance of licenses and of renewals of licenses is a formal matter not involving any controversy, and seems to be the performance of an executive
function. In the comparatively small proportion of cases where controversy
arises, and a hearing must be held and a decision made, there is, of course, a
distinctly judicial flavor to the proceedings, but, on the whole, it seems best
that the original determination should be made by the licensing authority.
The same is true, in a general way, of analogous matters, such as applications
for loans, applications for patents, and the admission or exclusion (but not
the expulsion) of aliens. In some (but not all) of these classes of cases,
the committee would want eventually to provide an appeal to the proposed
court so as to obtain independent review of the issues of fact as well as of
law, but only where the function exercised is judicial and not predominantly
executive in character. Where the latter is true, the remedy of the injured
individual would seem to be in the field of mandamus or injunction or other
extraordinary writ against the offending public official than by way of
formal appeal from his decision.
In passing I wish to call attention to the fact that both in the issuance or
renewal of licenses and in the revocation of licenses, the power exercised by
the administrative agency is complete in itself and self-executing and is just
as final as any court decision. And I am tempted to challenge anyone to cite
an instance where it is necessary, or even helpful, that the agency which
issued the license and prescribed the regulations under which the license is
held should also act as both prosecutor and judge in proceedings which may
28
later be instituted to revoke the license.
All the other functions which I have described as judicial the majority
of the committee would eventually want to see reposed in a federal administrative court.29 It happens, however, that the majority also believe that, with
28. There are, of course, a few cases where exceedingly speedy action in revocation cases
is necessary or highly desirable in the public interest. I, for one, am willing to except such

cases for the present. It is not the common experience, however, that commissions as a rule
act speedily.
29. A valued member of the committee as constituted in 1934-1935, Prof. Milton Handler of Columbia University School of Law, felt that further study should be made of certain
of these classes of cases and was not prepared to express a conclusion with regard to them.

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

respect to those same classes, other than the revocation-of-license cases, there
are obstacles of a practical character which furnish adequate reasons for not
attempting a more ambitious program than the one I shall presently outtine.
The committee is under no illusions, for example, as to the difficulty of getting a bill through Congress at the present time which would strip the Secretary of Agriculture, or the Secretary of the Interior, or the Secretary of
Commerce, or the Federal Trade Commission, of any sweeping description
of prerogatives. It must necessarily embark on a modest program.
The program on which a majority of the committee have reached agreement this year is that, as a basis for discussion, a bill should be introduced
in Congress under which the proposed court would start its career outfitted
with the trial or original jurisdiction now exercised by
(a) the Court of Claims;
(b) the Board of Tax Appeals;
(c) the Customs Court;
(d) the District Courts of the United States and the Supreme
Court of the District of Columbia over claims against the United States
and claims against the Collectors of Internal Revenue ;3o and
(e) the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia over actions
for writ of mandamus or of injunction or other extraordinary remedy
against officers and employees of the United States;
and with the appellate jurisdiction now exercised by the United States Court
of Customs and Patent Appeals together, of course, with jurisdiction to
review all decisions and judgment of the trial division. The jurisdiction of
a large number of (but not all) federal bureaus, boards, commissions and
officials over revocation-of-license cases would also be included. The proposal would contemplate that all the present members of the Court of Claims,
the Board of Tax Appeals, the Customs Court and the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals would become judges in the new administrative court with
life terms. This would make a total of thirty-five to which possibly five
judges should be added to take care of the increased work due to the jurisdiction which would be had by the court in matters over which none of these
four tribunals now has jurisdiction.
The committee's proposal is not really for the establishment of a fullfledged administrative court but for the nucleus of such a court In this form,
it is believed, it can hardly fail to work satisfactorily and, if it does work, one
by one the judicial functions of various federal administrative agencies can
be transferred over to it and the membership of the court would be corre30. Several members of the committee, including the writer, have been impressed with
the criticisms which have been made of the inclusion of this jurisdiction, and it is not at all

certain that the committee will advocate it.
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spondingly increased. As new agencies are created, the nucleus will be at
hand as an attractive place in which to house new judicial functions. Nothing need be done all at once. The experimentation will be slow and cautious.
I need hardly point out that the make-up of the original nucleus is not
due to any fault found with the agencies that would be absorbed. It is
precisely because they have proved the least subject to criticism, because
they have so thoroughly demonstrated judicial ability, temperament and
integrity and because they have the necessary experience and the general
confidence of the public, that they seem to furnish the logical foundation
on which to build. There would, indeed, be certain advantages which they
and persons subject to their jurisdiction, would derive from the merger.
Frankly, however, none of these advantages would, in itself, have moved
the majority of the committee to make the proposal. Its members are
looking to the future when such a court can be made the instrument for
gradually wiping out the evils in other administrative agencies, which have
faults that these tribunals do not have.
What progress has been made by the Special Committee on Administrative Law toward realization of this program? An answer to this question
will be assisted by a brief review of its work to date.
The committee was originally created by action of the Executive Committee of the American Bar Association early in May, 1933.31

At the

Annual Meeting of the Association held in Grand Rapids in August, 1933,
the committee presented a report consisting of a tentative outline of its
proposed activities, a review of the administrative law features of legislation enacted during the first session of the Seventy-third Congress, and a
brief comment on proposed legislation. 3 2 Among the fields of inquiry and
of activity enumerated by the committee was the following:
"The practicality and desirability of divorcing quasi-judicial
functions from quasi-legislative and executive functions in some or
all of those administrative tribunals in which such a combination of
functions now exists; of concentrating the quasi-judicial functions in
an independent body having the character of an administrative court
with appropriate branches and divisions and assisted by examiners or
commissioners, its decisions to be subject to judicial review; and of
concentrating the quasi-legislative and executive functions under executive officers responsible to the President." 33
Reference was made to a bill which had been introduced by Senator Logan
of Kentucky in the Seventy-third Congress, to establish an administrative
court, and the provisions of the bill were briefly summarized. Members of
31. (1933) 58 A. B. A. REP. 318.
32. Id. at 407.
33. Id. at 415.
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the Association were urged to study the bill and to communicate their views
to the committee.3 4
The following year, at the annual meeting held in Milwaukee, the
committee presented an extended report in which were set forth certain farreaching conclusions35 including the following:
"i. Segregation of JudicialFunctions.-In principle and with certain exceptions, the judicial functions of federal administrative tribunals
should be divorced from their legislative and executive functions, and
should be placed
(a) preferably in a federal administrative court with appropriate branches and divisions including an appellate division or,
failing that,
(b) in an appropriate number of independent tribunals (or
a combination of such tribunals and an administrative court) analogous to the Court of Claims, the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals and the Board of Tax Appeals,
in either case the tribunal to be limited to judicial functions, its members to hold office during good behavior or at least for long terms of
years, the tribunal to have power to make use of commissioners or
examiners and to establish branches and hold hearings anywhere in the
United States, and its decisions to be subject to judicial review to the
full extent permitted by the Constitution. In the future, no judicial
power should be delegated by Congress to any non-judicial tribunal
other than in accordance with the foregoing." 31
Among the exceptions expressly noted by the committee were certain commissions (and specifically the Interstate Commerce Commission) and the
General Accounting Office.3 7 The conclusion above quoted was discussed
at some length in the report, as were the difficulties lying in the way of its
full or immediate realization. The report stated:
"Consequently, the committee believes that a start should be made
somewhat along the lines followed in the bill introduced by Senator
Logan of Kentucky at the first session of the 73rd Congress, referred
to in last year's report, but with certain modifications designed to make
the court capable of receiving added jurisdiction from time to time
over new fields of administrative controversy." 38
After debate, the Association adopted a resolution recommended by the
committee in which, subject to the approval of the Executive Committee,
34. Id. at 426-427.

The Logan bill had been preceded by a similar but more restricted

bill introduced in an earlier Congress by Senator Norris. Col. 0. R. McGuire, now chairman of the committee, played an important role in the drafting of these bills.
35. (934) 59 A. B. A. REP. 539.
36. Id. at 539-540.
37. Id. at 540, 550.
38. Id. at 550. See also the analysis of the bill, Beelar, United States Administrative
Court (1936) 24 GEo. L. J. 944.
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the Association authorized the committee (inter alia) to draft and urge the
enactment of legislation in furtherance of its conclusions.
At a meeting of the Executive Committee held in Jacksonville, Fla., on
January 29-31, 1935, the committee presented an interim report in which

was presented a plan for a proposed federal administrative court in some
detail but not in the form of a draft bill. Since the plan did not differ
materially from the plan incorporated in the bill hereinafter discussed, it
need not be described in detail. The Executive Committee authorized the
committee to draft, or assist in the drafting of, a bill in accordance with the
plan, to appear before the appropriate committees of Congress in behalf
of such a bill, and by that and other proper steps to urge its enactment, 39
it being understood, of course, that when the draft was completed it would
be submitted to the Executive Committee.
Shortly after the general character of the proposal was made public,
the committee was advised that several groups in the profession were not in
agreement with certain features of the plan. Consequently, at a meeting
of the Executive Committee held in Washington, D. C., in May, 1935, the
committee appeared, explained the state of affairs, and asked to be excused
from having the bill introduced at the then-pending session of Congress.
Due to this situation, and the rapidly changing picture resulting during that
period from decisions of the Supreme Court and legislation then threatened
in Congress, the committee made no formal report to the Association at its
Annual Meeting in Los Angeles in July, 1935.40 Instead, it participated in
an open meeting with the Judicial Section and the National Conference
of Judicial Councils, the sessions of which were principally devoted to a
41
discussion of the proposal.

A bill incorporating the plan had been drafted by the committee in the
winter and spring of 1935. After two meetings of the committee held in
the fall of 1935, agreement on the part of four of the five members of the
committee was reached on a draft that might suitably be introduced in Congress to serve as a basis for discussion, the committee freely recognizing
that it contained flaws and imperfections. The committee appeared before
the Executive Committee at its meeting held in Chicago in January, 1936,
and explained that it desired to have the bill introduced, unaccompanied at
this time by the approval of either the Association, the Executive Committee, or even of the committee itself, in order to bring about the necessary
discussion and to make the start which must always be made in imperfect
fashion in a matter of this magnitude. The Executive Committee approved
39. (935)

21

A. B. A. J. 133. The major features of the plan were summarized in this

article.

40. (1935) 6o A. B. A. REP.
41. Id. at 615-621.
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this course of action. As a result, the chairman of the committee delivered
the bill to Senator Logan who introduced it. 42 It was referred to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. This is the bill's present status, there having
been no hearings and it being unlikely that hearings will be held during this
Congress. The bill has been ably summarized and explained in a recently
published article by the chairman of the committee, accompanied by a reprint of its important provisions. 3 It is unnecessary here to repeat that
summary and explanation. The bill will constitute one of the important
topics for discussion at the next annual meeting of the Association, to be
held at Boston in August, 1936, at which time the Association will be asked
to adopt a resolution approving the proposal of a federal administrative
court in principle, with certain essential features. It will not be asked to
approve or disapprove any particular bill on this subject, or to determine
what jurisdiction should be taken at the outset.
The suggestion has been made that while there is merit to the committee's thought that the judicial functions of federal administrative agencies
should be segregated (or subject to adequate review), this should be accomplished not by one administrative court with branches, but by a multiplicity
of appellate bodies similar to the Board of Tax Appeals.4 The Committee
has given careful consideration to this suggestion and, in fact, in its report
of last year this is listed as an alternative proposal.
Such a course would be infinitely preferable to continuation of the
present chaos, and perhaps, as a practical matter, it is all that will ultimately
be achieved. The committee is, however, more optimistic than that, not for
tomorrow or for next year but for the years to come. Its members cannot
persuade themselves that they should profess to be satisfied with setting up
seventy-three varieties of midget courts in Washington, with all the attendant evils which inevitably follow in the train of such a multiplicity.
The committee is under no illusions or delusions as to the practical
obstacles in the way. The picture frequently painted of them involves no
exaggeration. The committee realizes that, as Lord Beaconsfield said:
"England is not governed by logic; she is governed by Parliament." At any
rate, and in spite of the obvious difficulties, it has chosen to hitch its wagon
to a star.
42. SEN. REP. No. 3787, 74th Cong., 2d Sess., introduced Jan. 22, 1936, entitled "A Bill to
establish a United States Administrative Court to expedite the hearing and determination of
contriversies with the United States, and for other purposes." Since then, on April 15, 1936,
the bill has been introduced in the House by Congressman Celler of New York as H. R.
No. 12,297.
43. McGuire, The Proposed United States Administrative Court (1936) 22 A. B.
A. J. 197.

44. See summary of address delivered by Hon. John Dickinson on July 16, 1935, before

joint meeting of the Judicial Section and the National Conference of Judicial Councils (1935)
6o A. B. A. REP. 616.

